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Available online 15 January 2015 Family business plays important roles to fuel economic growth in China. Due to the one-child pol-
icy, family ﬁrms are increasingly facing human capital constraints for within-family succession.
Having only one heir decreases the probability of continuing family management by over 3%, re-
duces the probability of adult children working in family ﬁrms by 14%, and signiﬁcantly decreases
founders' expectations of having young heirs for succession. Having fewer children negatively
affects founder's expectation to go public, reduces family ﬁrm's reinvestment rate and R&D. Over-
all, the evidence suggests that the human capital constraints due to the one-child policy impose
signiﬁcant negative impacts on within-family succession. Dynastic management of family ﬁrms
remains an important challenge for ﬁrst-generation entrepreneurs in China.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Fertility choice and demographic changes are important factors that can foster economic growth (Barro and Becker, 1989; Becker
et al., 1990). The one-child policy successfully implemented in China in 1979 has resulted in a signiﬁcant drop in China's population
growth rate during the last three decades, which has been credited for stabilizing China's rapidly growing population and contributing
to its tremendous economic growth (Bloom and Canning, 2003; Cai and Wang, 2005). Conversely, the policy has been widely
criticized internationally for violating fundamental human rights through forced sterilizations and abortions, as well as for reducing
family stability and accelerating aging populations. Regardless of its controversial nature, the one-child policy was extended through
a new legislation in 2001 as the nation's demographic strategy for the future andwill continue to cast a long-lasting impact on Chinese
family planning and populations.
In this paper, instead of holistically examining the policy's overall economic impact, we take family ﬁrms as our study context to
examine its impact on within-family succession. Within-family succession is important since most family businesses are mainly
controlled andmanaged by their founders or founder's family members. The advantage of studying family ﬁrms is that the outcomes
associatedwith the constraints of human capital or lack of talented heirs are easily measurable by ﬁrm governance, performance, and
corporate decisions. Several theoretical papers show that family ﬁrms remain prevalent in economies with weak legal investor
protections or under-developed external markets for managers. For example, Burkart et al. (2003) show that family ﬁrms by and
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large pass ownership/control and management to family members such as heirs in countries with weak legal environments.
Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2003) show in their model that family ﬁrms will face a higher threshold of management professional-
ization in weak ﬁnancial markets due to the under-development of external markets for CEOs and managers. China, with its weak
institutional environment and poor external managerial market, offers a perfect setting to examine family ﬁrm succession from the
perspectives of governance and corporate ﬁnance. Within-family succession is a crucial issue for Chinese family ﬁrms, which are
characterized by credit constraints, poorly developed ﬁnancial markets, and high agency costs of external managers. Dynastic
management of within-family succession remains the key issue that ﬁrst-generation founders have to address as they get older. In
most family ﬁrms, founders expect to pass their businesses to heirs or within-family members but at the same timewant tomaintain
tight control of such corporations.
Within-family succession includes identifying and developing internal heirs who have the potential to ﬁll leadership and control-
ling positions in the family owned businesses. Hence, successionmanagement remains the top priority because family businesses that
fail to negotiate this transition must often face discontinuity — either being sold for lack of a family member willing or able to take
over. Yet because many prior studies treat a founder CEO's family as a monolithic whole with a large pool of heirs who automatically
wish to participate in family control of the business, emerging research has yet to identify individual family members' incentives for
such dynastic management. Caselli and Gennaioli (2011) argue that if the heir to the family ﬁrm has no talent for managerial decision
making, dynastic management as a failure of meritocracy will reduce a ﬁrm's productivity. Empirically, Bennedson et al. (2007) show
that family succession results in value reduction in developed countries due to lack of talented heirs. Bertrand et al. (2008) analyze the
allocation of control, management, and ownership to different family members in large family business groups in Thailand and ﬁnd
that such optimal allocation choices explain ﬁrm-level performance. Pérez-González (2006) ﬁnds that in Mexico family internal suc-
cession leads to underperformance. In East Asian nations, Fan et al. (2012) show that the entrepreneurial ﬁrm's accounting system is
more likely to shift to a less insider-based system after successionwhen family ﬁrms possessmore specialized assets. In another study,
Fan et al. (2013) ﬁnd that within-family succession is chosen over outside succession when a ﬁrm has been co-managed by multiple
family members and when its business depends on relationships with stakeholders such as employees and banks.
In this paper, we focus on family ﬁrms' succession as the main research question. In particular, we utilize the constraints on the
family ﬁrm's human capital pool caused by the one-child policy as a natural experiment. We believe that our study is the ﬁrst empir-
ical study to understand how succession decisions are affected by a decreasing number of children or potential heirs and how such
constraints affect family ﬁrms in China. The literature recognizes that human capital is important for family ﬁrms and that heirs are
often not equally likely to participate in (and thus succeed to) control of the family business. There exist multiple forces underlying
within-family succession. First, the management of a family-owned ﬁrm is only one of several job options available to an heir. In
the Chinese culture, the ﬁrst-born child is often the default choice for succession. However, if another child would be a better
match (both in terms of skills and his/her interests) to run the ﬁrm, the chance for the ﬁrst born heir to succeed will drop. Secondly,
there is tournament effect amongmultiple children for within-family succession. In the tournament, the pressure of competition can
make children invest more in developing their skills. As a result, only the most skilled children will be picked to succeed to family
businesses.
In China, the one-child policy exogenously imposes constraints1 on talent/heir availability for family ﬁrm's succession. One direct
undesired consequence of the one-child policy is that family ﬁrms face a lack of multiple heirs for tournament. Chinese family ﬁrms
hence provide us a close-to-natural experiment to examine the decision of family succession. If there are cross-sectional variations
among the number of available children in family ﬁrms, succession decisions will differ correspondingly. We hypothesize that the
lack of multiple children imposed by the one-child policy will negatively affect family succession decisions. Empirically we can
compare the succession decisions in the families with one child to the succession in the families with multiple children. If founders
of family ﬁrms only consider passing the control of businesses to the ﬁrst-born child, the number of children will not affect family
succession decisions. If founders implicitly consider multiple children for succession, number of children or a dummy of having one
child will have signiﬁcant impact on family management or founders' expectation to pass their businesses to the next generation
heirs.
Our research contribution is that we have a clear natural setting where family ﬁrms have a constrained talent pool of heirs due to
the binding effect of the one-child policy. In contrast, most prior studies assume that there is a large pool of heirs for succession to
family ﬁrms so that family control can continue with few constraints. In the real world, however, family ﬁrms may face the problem
of discontinuity when their pool of candidates for succession is limited or restricted. Such limitation will impose a great cost on
dynastic management and ﬁrms according to Bertrand et al. (2008). Although the succession problem can be partially solved by
alternative arrangements, e.g., adopting sons2 or hiring external managers, internal succession remains the prevalent norm for family
business in emerging markets. Unlike the United States (U.S.) or Europe, many emerging countries, tend to have underdeveloped
external job markets for talented managers. Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2003) suggest that family ﬁrms face a higher threshold
of management professionalization, external succession by hiring outside managers is often considered as the last resort. Extant
research also suggests that family control or internal heir succession tends to carry with it the great beneﬁt of private control.
Hence Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) propose that high-performing family businesses
1 Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show that ﬁnancial constraints such as the lack of credit are bad for talented but poor entrepreneurs. Chami and IMF Institute (2001)
examine family ﬁrms in terms of principal–agent relationships between parent/owner and child/employee and ﬁnds that in family ﬁrms, trust, altruism, and the pros-
pect of succession mitigate the agency problem relative to the parents' hiring of outside employees.
2 Mehrotra et al. (2011) examine the effect on ﬁrm performance of the Japanese practice of adopting male heirs into the family business from outside if the family's
own heir is not ﬁt for or interested in succession. Such a practice, however, is not common in China.
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are more likely to make working in the family ﬁrm more attractive to potential heirs, thereby increasing the likelihood that family
control will continue. Fernandez et al. (2007) discussed the topic of gender and family ﬁrms and ﬁnd that the role of women in family
ﬁrms is important. All these studies suggest that within-family succession is relevant and the impact of the one-child policy is eco-
nomically signiﬁcant.
The one-child policy, enacted in late 1979, applies to all families in China. First, this policy applies to couples wanting to havemore
than one child after 1979 but not those before, providing us a cross-sectional identiﬁcation for exogenous tests. Second, the enforce-
ment of this policy varies between urban areas and rural areas as well as between the Han race and minority races,3 both offering us
cross-sectional identiﬁcation tests to examine its exogenous effects. Furthermore, the one-child policy has varying binding effects
on populations. For example, government employees and urban residents are more likely to suffer stricter constraints. Such cross-
sectional binding effects offer good instruments to study the exogenous effects on family succession decisions. In sum, the one-
child policy provides a close-to natural experimental scenario which can be used to examine the impact of within-family succession
and the discontinuation of family businesses.
In particular, as a direct consequence of this policy to control the general population, many family ﬁrms in China have a lack of
appropriate heirs to succeed to the business. In fact, most family-controlled ﬁrms have only one heir for internal succession. This pol-
icy therefore exogenously imposes constraints on family continuation in terms of the family's control and management of its own
ﬁrm. We hypothesize that the poor availability of (talented) heirs due to the one child policy imposes discontinuation of dynastic
management of family-controlled businesses. The hypothesis allows us to empirically test a negative/positive relationship between
one-child dummy/number of children and family succession decisions. Succession can be measured by an expectation of having
young heirs or direct family members to succeed to family ﬁrms or having adult children to work in their own ﬁrms. According to
prior research, the fundamental drivers of family control lie in family members' ability to inﬂuence ﬁrm activities and decisions.
The lack of enough talented heirs to work in the ﬁrm ultimately affects family control and dynastic management, and thus the
founder's corporate decisions. Our second hypothesis is that the poor availability of (talented) heirs due to the one child policy
imposes a likelihood of discontinuity of family ﬁrms. This hypothesis is empirically tested with a positive relationship between a
dummy of having one child and ﬁrm's reinvestment rate or R&D expenses.
To examine whether a family member (primarily, the heir) will take control of a family ﬁrm and how the availability of (male vs.
female) heirs affects founders' succession expectations and the ﬁrms' dynastic management, we draw on data from two comprehen-
sive surveys on Chinese small and medium family-run enterprises. These two surveys not only ask the founder CEOs whether they
hope that their children will work in the ﬁrm in the future, but also request a variety of information about the ﬁrm, the founder
CEO, and his/her descendants.
We ﬁnd that not only the number of heirs but also the heirs' opportunity outside the family business has a signiﬁcant impact on
both the family's control andmanagement of the family business and the succession decision. Speciﬁcally, themore children that the
founder CEO has, the less the restraint there is against passing the family business on to the next generation. Having one child is sig-
niﬁcantly negatively associatedwith founder's expectation of having that young child to succeed to his business or adult child towork
in the family ﬁrm.We also ﬁnd that having amale child is signiﬁcantly associatedwith a founder's expectation of passing his business
to heirs.
One concern is that having one child is not exogenous due to the one-child policy in ﬁrm's succession decisions, since founders
may choose voluntarily to have multiple children despite the threat of civil punishment. We therefore use two-stage regressions to
control for this endogeneity issue since enforcement of the one-child policy varies across between villages and cities, between govern-
ment employees and the self-employed, aswell as betweenmembers of the Han race andminority races. The two-stage instrumental
regressions employ several instrumental variables, including age of entrepreneurs at the year of enactment of the one-child policy
(older entrepreneurs are not subject to the policy during their reproductive age), dummy of minority race (not subject to any
constraint by the one-child policy), dummy of resident place in town or village (binding of policy not strong), or former employees
of government (strictly subject to the one-child policy). The ﬁrst-stage regression shows the validity of these instruments. After
controlling for endogenous effects, we are able to report signiﬁcantly stronger and robust relationships between the one-child policy
and ﬁrm succession decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the background of the one-child policy and the development of
family businesses in China. Section 3 describes the data selection, deﬁnes the variables, and outlines the empirical methods. Section 4
discusses the empirical ﬁndings and provides endogeneity tests, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Brief history of the one-child policy and Chinese family ﬁrms
The one-child policy enacted in China in 1979 ofﬁcially restricts married couples to only one child, as codiﬁed in the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council's Resolution Concerning the Strengthening of Birth Control and Strictly
Controlling Population Growth (1980):
The State advocates that one couple has only one child. Except for special cases, with approval for second birth, government
ofﬁcials, workers and urban residents can only have one child for each couple. In rural areas, the State also advocates that each
couple has only one child. However, with approval, those who have real difﬁculties can have their second child, several years
after the birth of the ﬁrst.
3 People of a minority race are not subject to the one-child policy.
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Some exceptions are allowed; for example, couples inwhich both partners are single childrenmay be allowed two offspring. Some
parents are allowed a second child if their ﬁrst is a girl or if they suffer “hardship” as determined by local ofﬁcials. Minorities (such as
Tibetans or Uighurs) are permitted a second—and sometimes a third—child, whichever the sex of the ﬁrst-born. Children born in
countries overseas are not counted under the policy if they do not take Chinese citizenship, and Chinese citizens returning from
abroad are allowed a second child or more children born overseas. In most cases, however, the birth of additional children results
in large ﬁnes: families violating the policy must pay monetary penalties and could be penalized in various ways ranging from social
pressure to job loss. One article in the Economist, July 21, 2011 decries this situation: “Before 1997 they usually punished us by tearing
down our houses for breaching the one-child policy…. After 2000 they began to conﬁscate our children.” Several unintended conse-
quences of the one-child policy have begun to impact social or economic status in China, as well as family structure and dynamics.
Some immediate consequences include the unbalanced sex ratios and urban–rural ratios of newborns, the changing of family and
kinship structure and the speeding up of population aging. It remains to be seen what the impact of such policy on family businesses
in China will be, a current unknown that this research attempts to address.
Not only are family businesses prevalent worldwide—comprising 70% of businesses across the globe—but family businesses are in
fact a more common type of business ownership than public corporations with dispersed ownership (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; La
Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga and Amit, 2009). In the U.S., Villalonga and Amit (2006) ﬁnd that a large portion of Fortune 500 compa-
nies are characterized by the presence of family ownership but that such family ownership creates value only when it is combined
with certain forms of family control and management. Claessens et al. (2000, 2002) suggest that family ﬁrms are a norm in Asian
countries and performwell. Inmainland China, althoughmany large businesses are state owned, there is a very rapid growth of family
businesses, especially small andmediumprivate enterprises, most of which aremanaged as family concerns. Indeed, according to one
recent study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the non-public sectorwent frombeingworth nothing in 1980s to beingworth
19 trillion RMB (approximately USD2.6 trillion) in 2008, contributing 65% of the country's GDP and accounting for 75% of national
employment and around half the country's tax revenue.
In most Chinese family-owned small and medium enterprises, there is no separation of ownership rights and management and
both are held fast by family members with blood ties and marriage relations. As a result, business decision procedures are often
replaced by family management and decision procedures. Unfortunately, however, although some argue that it is unnecessary to
separate ownership rights from control rights because so many family businesses performwell, there have been no satisfactory the-
oretical explanations offered for this phenomenon. What is apparent is that the choice of successor is vital for the healthy develop-
ment and continuance of a family business and thus has great importance for family business ownership. In fact, to maintain family
control over the business, in most cases, the business owner determines the choice of a successor based on inheritance through
“blood ties” or “younger family generations.” Nonetheless, there are cultural differences: in Japan, succession is seen as a foundation
for the children's professionalism rather than as a priority (Mehrotra et al., 2011),whereas in China, it is viewed as a family legacy and
a top priority (Wong et al., 1992).
3. Data and variables
3.1. Data
This researchdraws on data from two surveys carried out by theChinese Private Enterprises Research Taskforce, a research author-
ity organized by the Chinese central government. The ﬁrst survey, administered in 2002 and funded jointly by the Chinese Society of
Industrialization and the Commerce and Chinese Private Economic Society, encompasses 3258 ﬁrms across more than 30 provinces.
We also use a supplementary sample, the second survey carried out in 1997 and funded by the Chinese Social Science Society, which
covers 1654 small and medium family-owned enterprises across 30 provinces in China. Because these two surveys use different
questionnaires, we perform different analyses using both datasets to ensure the inclusion of relevant information. For example, the
1997 survey has more information on the business owners' succession plans (e.g., expectations of whether their children will work
in the family ﬁrm) but lacks accurate information on the number of children (it only reports up to 2). The 2002 survey, in contrast,
has more information on the family ﬁrm founders' descendants but does not report their detailed succession plans. We therefore
use the comprehensive sample of the 2002 survey in most of the analyses but also draw on the 1997 data for information on
succession expectations.
3.2. Variables
Themajor variables, deﬁned in Appendix Table 1, include information on heirs, succession, and control; founder and family demo-
graphics; and ﬁrm characteristics. The One_Child dummy corresponds to only one child being reported in the survey, Num_Child cor-
responds to the exact number of children reported. To directly measure the ﬁrm succession plan, we use a Family_Management
dummy, which equals one if in the survey a founder expects that the ﬁrm will continue to be managed or controlled by family. We
also use several other proxies for heir succession; for example, Adult_Kid_In is a dummy that equals one if any adult child is already
working in the family ﬁrm, zero otherwise; and Kids_Hope_In is a dummy that equals one if any of the children are expected to
work in the family ﬁrm in the future, zero otherwise. Because many prior papers use equity control as the main deﬁning criterion
for family business, we measure family control of the ﬁrm using a similar variable, Capital_Ownership.
Because the surveys also provide data on ﬁrm ﬁnancial and management structure, we include an IPO_Hope dummy that equals
one if the ﬁrm owner expects the ﬁrm to launch an IPO in the future and zero otherwise, and a Bond_Hope dummy that equals one
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if the business owner is planning to issue bond. The variables for the founder and family's demographic information include
Owner_Age, Owner_Gender, Owner_College (a dummy variable that equals one if the owner's education level is college and above),
Child1_Gender and Child2_Gender (both dummy variables, equivalent to one if the child is male). The ﬁrm characteristics include
Firm_Village_Town (a dummy that equals one if a family ﬁrm's headquarter is located in a town or village), Firm_Age, Firm_Employee,
Sales, and ROS (net proﬁts/sales). Reinvestment rate is calculated as reinvestment of capital divided by the prior year's sales. R&D is the
research and development expense divided by the prior year's sales.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics on child information, succession information, founder family demographics, and ﬁrm char-
acteristics. As regards the ﬁrst, the majority or 69% of family business owners have only one descendant, and the average number of
children is 1.22. This is consistent with the binding constraints of the one-child policy. On average 38% of founders expect that their
family-run ﬁrmswill continue to be controlled andmanaged by family. Only 21% of founders expect their ﬁrms to go public while 3%
want to issue bonds. On average, founders have a mean (median) age of 42 years (44 years) and 89% of them are male. Regarding
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Panel A: The 2002 survey of privately owned small and medium enterprises (3258 ﬁrms)
One_Child 0.69 1 0.46 0 1
Num_Child 1.22 1 0.65 0 5
Family_Management 0.38 0 0.48 0 1
Adult_Kid_In 0.15 0 0.36 0 1
IPO_Hope 0.21 0 0.41 0 1
Bond_Hope 0.03 0 0.17 0 1
Owner_Age 42.43 44 8.69 31 76
Owner_Gender 0.89 1 0.31 0 1
Owner_College 0.38 0 0.49 0 1
Firm_Village_Town 0.34 0 0.47 0 1
Family_Size 5.19 5 2.12 1 33
Firm_Age 11.27 10 5.97 1 36
Firm_Employee 88.62 32 188.71 3 2.311
Capital_Ownership 0.76 0.90 0.26 0 1
Capital (million RMB) 3.51 1.00 10.07 0.11 460.00
Sales (million RMB) 6.67 6.5 232.27 0.10 350.00
ROS (%) 7.62 4.58 17.62 −300 500
Panel B: The 1997 survey of privately owned small and medium enterprises (1942 ﬁrms)
One_Child 0.56 1 0.49 0 1
Family_Management 0.37 0 0.48 0 1
Kids_Hope_In 0.43 0 0.49 0 1
Adult_Kid_In 0.20 0 0.38 0 1
Child1_Gender (male) 0.68 1 0.47 0 1
Child2_Gender (male) 0.41 0 0.49 0 1
This table summarizes the key variables about demographic information of family ﬁrms and the variables related to family dynastic management. Panel A reports the
summary statistics with the 2002 survey data and Panel B reports the summary with the 1997 survey data.
Table 1
Deﬁnition of variables.
Variable Deﬁnition
One_Child (dummy) One child reported in the survey
Num_Child The number of children reported in the survey
Family_Management (dummy) Whether there is an expectation that the ﬁrm will continue to be managed/controlled by family
IPO_Hope (dummy) Whether the ﬁrm is expected to launch an IPO in the future
Bond_Hope (dummy) Whether the ﬁrm is expected to issue bond in the future
Owner_Age Entrepreneur's age
Owner_Gender Whether the entrepreneur is male
Owner_College Whether the entrepreneur's education is college level and above
Firm_Village_Town Whether the ﬁrm headquarters is located in a town or village
Family_Size Number of family members living together
Firm_Age Years since the ﬁrm became registered as a privately-owned enterprise
Firm_Employee Number of employees
Capital_Ownership Ownership of capital by the entrepreneur
Capital Amount of capital (in million yuan)
Sales Sales (in million yuan)
ROS Net proﬁt/sales (%)
Kids_Hope_In Whether any of the children is expected to work in the family ﬁrm
Adult_Kid_In Whether the adult child is working in the ﬁrm
Child1_Gender Whether adult child is male
Child2_Gender Whether another adult child is
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education, 38% have at least a college education. In terms of family ﬁrm characteristics, as measured at the end of 2001, 34% of family
ﬁrms have their headquarters in towns or villages, a family ﬁrm has a mean (median) age of 11 years (10 years) and employs a
mean (median) 88 (32) full-time workers. On average, founders hold 76% of the capital ownership of their ﬁrms. Family ﬁrms have
3.51 million RMB in capital and deliver a mean of 6.67 million RMB in sales. Additionally, according to the 1997 survey data, 43% of
the family ﬁrm founders expect that their descendantswill work in their family-runﬁrms, and the founder's adult children are already
working in about 18% of all family ﬁrms.
4. Main results
4.1. The impact on the family succession
In Table 3, we divide the sample according to whether the family ﬁrm founder has one child or more than one child and report
their sample average and t-test of themeandifference. As shown in the table, there are noticeable differences between the two groups
for both surveys' data. For example, family ﬁrmswith fewer children are apparently less likely to show the expectation by founders to
continue familymanagement. For example, only 36% ofﬁrms report towant to continue familymanagementwhen founders have one
or no child, compared to 44% when founders have more than one child. Similarly, the former group reports that only 7% has an adult
child working in family ﬁrmswhile the latter group reports 41%. There are no differences between the two groups in terms of owner's
age or gender. However, there is a selection issue. For those founders with fewer children, they are more likely to be located in cities
and have higher education.
One issue with the Univariate test is that the ﬁrms with less than one child also include cases when founders have no child. We
therefore use the 1997 survey data and compare ﬁrms with heirs only and report the analysis in Panel B. Similarly, family ﬁrms
with one child are less likely to have family continuing management or an adult child working in their own ﬁrms.
Overall, Table 3 shows that family ﬁrms with fewer heirs have signiﬁcantly lower within-family succession including both lower
expectations of expecting family to manage their businesses in the future or already involving adult children to work in family ﬁrms.
In Table 4, we use Probit regressions to identify the factors that drive a family's within-family succession,which ismeasured by the
Family_Management dummy (equals one if the founder expects family heirs to control and manage the family business and zero
Table 3
Comparison of family ﬁrms conditional on with at least one child.
Panel A: 2002 survey data
Split-sample summary
Variable Number of children = 1
(obs. = 2243)
Number of children N 1
(obs. = 787)
Difference
Mean Median Mean Median P-value
Family_Management 0.36 0 0.44 0 0.00
Adult_Kid_In 0.07 0 0.41 0 0.00
IPO_Hope 0.21 0 0.20 0 0.62
Bond_Hope 0.03 0 0.04 0 0.00
Owner_Age 41.66 40 48.54 48 0.45
Owner_Gender (male) 0.87 1 0.92 1 0.17
Owner_College 0.43 0 0.25 0 0.00
Firm_Village_Town 0.31 0 0.46 0 0.00
Family_Size 4.91 5 6.05 6 0.00
Firm_Age 10.58 9 13.44 13 0.00
Capital_Ownership 0.75 0.8 0.77 0.9 0.55
Capital (millions RMB) 12.58 3 9.26 3 0.00
Sales (millions RMB) 27.67 6.5 36.4 6.2 0.00
ROS (%) 7.34 4.44 7.42 4.84 0.82
Panel B: 1997 survey data
Split-sample summary
Variable Number of children = 1
(obs. = 371)
Number of children N 1
(obs. = 286)
Difference
Mean Median Mean Median P-value
Family_Management 0.35 0 0.43 0 0.03
Kids_Hope_In 0.39 0 0.55 1 0.00
Adult_Kid_In 0.31 0 0.46 1 0.00
Child1_Gender (male) 0.64 1 0.72 1 0.02
Child2_Gender (male) None None 0.39 0
The table reports the comparison of family ﬁrm's or founder's characteristics as well as ﬁrm's dynastic management between those with one heir only and those with
more than one heir. Panel A reports the mean and median with the sample of the 2002 survey that includes family ﬁrms with child number greater than one. Panel B
reports the mean and median with the sample of the 1997 survey that includes family ﬁrms with child number greater than one.
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otherwise). This variable captures founder's expectation of keeping control andmanagementwithin the family (using the survey data
on the founder CEO's expectations for the family's role in the family business). We include two explanatory variables of interest: the
one-child dummy and the number of children that founders have. Other controls include owner's age, owner's education level, ﬁrm
location, ﬁrm's vintage year, logarithm of sales, and ROS. Industry ﬁxed effects are included and heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics
are reported in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimates for the marginal probability.
The one-child dummyhas negative coefﬁcients in Probit regressions. Having only one child reduceswithin-family succession by at
least 2.5%, and its effect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. If we use the number of children instead of this one child dummy,
there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between number of children and within-family succession. The evidence suggests that an
insufﬁcient number of children results in low incentives for entrepreneurs to keep the control and management of their businesses
within family.
Other coefﬁcient estimates are consistent with common sense. For example, older entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs from towns/
villages tend to continue within-family succession for their businesses. Well-educated entrepreneurs are less likely to expect
within-family succession. Firms with more concentrated ownership by family or smaller ﬁrms are more likely to keep management
or control within the family.
We measure within-family succession with Family_Management in this subsection. In Table 5 we use an alternative measure of
within-family succession — an indicator for adult children working in family ﬁrms. We run Probit regressions to identify the factors
that drive this within-family succession decision.
The one-child dummy has negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in Probit regressions. Economically, having one child reduces the
likelihood of adult children working in their own ﬁrms by 14%. Although this can be driven partially by a mechanic reason, since
young founders may not have a child or an adult child. We therefore use the number of children instead of the one child dummy
to exclude those founders without children, andwe continue to report a signiﬁcant positive relationship between number of children
and the likelihood of having adult childrenworking in their own ﬁrms. The evidence suggests that an insufﬁcient number of children
results in low likelihood of entrepreneurs arranging children towork in their own ﬁrms, a critical procedure forwithin-family succes-
sion. Similar to prior results, other coefﬁcient estimates are consistently intuitive. For example, older entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs
from towns/villages tend to arrange for their adult children towork for their own ﬁrms.Well-educated entrepreneurs are less likely to
maintain their own children within-family ﬁrms.
The one-child policy in theory should apply uniformly to every entrepreneur in our sample. In reality entrepreneurs may not
choose to strictly comply with this restriction. There can be potential endogeneity issues, either because ﬁrm founders intentionally
Table 4
Probit analysis of the determinants of family management.
Explanatory variable Dependent variable
Family_Management
(i) Probit (ii) Probit (iii) Probit (iv) Probit
One_Child −3.97⁎⁎ −2.45⁎
(2.28) (1.87)
Num_Child 18.13⁎⁎⁎ 8.81⁎⁎⁎
(21.42) (11.92)
Owner_Age 0.48⁎⁎⁎ 1.17⁎⁎⁎
(3.51) (16.56)
Owner_College −7.73⁎⁎⁎ −7.79⁎⁎⁎
(3.37) (3.33)
Firm_Village_Town 7.92⁎⁎⁎ 7.98⁎⁎⁎
(2.53) (3.54)
Firm_Age 0.43 0.42
(1.45) (1.67)
Capital_Ownership 31.23⁎⁎⁎ 31.29⁎⁎⁎
(7.72) (7.76)
Log(Sales) −4.62⁎⁎⁎ −4.61⁎⁎⁎
(6.73) (6.72)
Sales_Growth −2.41 −2.42
(1.41) (1.15)
ROS 9.20 9.16
(1.53) (1.52)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3258 3258 3258 3258
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.06
Notes: The table reports marginal probability coefﬁcients.
This table reports the determinants of family ﬁrm's dynastic management with the 2002 survey data on Chinese small and medium enterprises. The sample includes
3030 observations and we only exclude ﬁrms having founder's children already working in family ﬁrms. The analysis employs Probit regressions and report marginal
probability for the coefﬁcients. The dependent variable is Family_Management (dummy equals 1 if the founder has expectation that the ﬁrm will continue to be
managed/controlled by family). The regressions winsorize the sample at 1% based on ﬁrm sales. The robust t-stat is reported in parentheses.
⁎ Represents 10% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎ Represents 5% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎⁎ Represents 1% statistical signiﬁcance.
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choose to violate the one-child policy so that they have more children for within-family succession, or because entrepreneurs
voluntarily choose to have one child when they can have more children. We therefore need to address this endogeneity bias.
We utilize two-stage regressions to address this problem. The instruments chosen in the ﬁrst-step regression will only be related
with the effectiveness of the one-child policy but should have nothing to do with within-family succession decisions. The cross-
sectional variations in the binding effects of the one-child policy offer the use several perfect instruments. First, because the one-
child policy does not apply tominority races but only tomembers of theHan race in China, whether the founder belongs to aminority
race is a good candidate. Since minority races are not subject to the one-child policy, we expect that this dummy negatively predicts
one child for founders. Second, the one-child policy was enacted in 1980 and therefore does not apply to people older than 35
(another cutting point is 40) in 1980with children. Founders older than 35who choose to havemore than one child should not suffer
the binding effects of the one-child policy.We empirically expect that their age at the year of 1980 should be negatively related to the
dummy of having one child. Third, we include a dummy to indicate entrepreneurs who have worked as civil employees as the one-
child policy often has strong binding effects on civil employees. Lastly, we include a dummy for a ﬁrm located in a town or village,
since the one-child policy is often easily circumvented in non-urban areas.
In the ﬁrst stage, we run a Probit regression with these four instruments and then generate a predicted probability for a given
founder having one child only due to the varying binding effects of the one-child policy. The ﬁrst-stage regression produces results
consistent with our predictions. For example, founders of a minority race, older than 35 or 40 at the year of 1980, or located in
town or village are less likely to have one child, while founders whoworked in government sectors as civil employees are more likely
to have one child. The Wald test accepts the speciﬁcation of instrument variables in the ﬁrst stage regression.
We calculate the predicted probability from the ﬁrst stage and use it as the independent variable of interest in the second stage. In
the second stage, we run Probit regressions similar to the results reported in Tables 4 and 5. The dependent variables include either
Family_Management or Adult_Kid_In.Weﬁnd strong and negative coefﬁcients for the one-child dummy. For example, having one child
only reduces the likelihood of within-family succession (expectation of continued family control) by 17% and of adult children work-
ing in their ownﬁrmsby60%. Consistentwith prior results, entrepreneur's education is negatively related towithin-family succession.
These results conﬁrm the prior analysis that having one child due to the one-child policy does negatively affect within-family
succession of family ﬁrms in China.
One concernwith the analysis in Tables 4 and 5 is that the regressions include all familyﬁrms evenwhen founders have no child or
the child is too young for succession consideration. We therefore utilize the 1997 survey to analyze this within-family succession
conditional on the children being adult and ready for succession, since the 1997 survey reports this information. We thus study
Table 5
Probit analysis of the determinants of expecting child to work in the family ﬁrm.
Explanatory variable Dependent variable
Adult_Kid_In
(i) Probit (ii) Probit (iii) Probit (iv) Probit
One_Child −24.29⁎⁎⁎ −14.01⁎⁎⁎
(17.31) (9.83)
Num_Child 18.31⁎⁎⁎ 9.96⁎⁎⁎
(19.44) (11.70)
Owner_Age 1.39⁎⁎⁎ 1.25⁎⁎⁎
(11.14) (12.88)
Owner_College −5.13⁎⁎⁎ −4.61⁎⁎⁎
(3.93) (3.70)
Firm_Village_Town 3.15⁎⁎ 2.84⁎⁎
(2.56) (2.39)
Firm_Age 0.04 0.01
(0.32) (0.10)
Capital_Ownership (%) 0.02 0.02
(1.16) (0.90)
Log(Sales) −0.06 0.51
(0.10) (1.44)
ROS −0.46 0.26
(0.21) (0.12)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3258 3258 3258 3258
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.35 0.19 0.37
Notes: The table reports marginal probability coefﬁcients.
This table reports the determinants of family ﬁrm's dynastic management with the 2002 survey data on Chinese small and medium enterprises. The sample includes
3030 observations and we only exclude ﬁrms having founder's children already working in family ﬁrms. The analysis employs Probit regressions and report marginal
probability for the coefﬁcients. The dependent variable is Adult_Kid_In (dummy equals 1 if adult children are working in family ﬁrms). The regressions winsorize the
sample at 1%. The robust t-stat is reported in parentheses.
⁎⁎ Represents 5% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎⁎ Represents 1% statistical signiﬁcance.
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whether the gender of adult children matters in within-family succession. In Table 7, we report the Probit regressions of whether an
adult child is working in the family ﬁrm, a close measure of adult children's within-family succession. (See Table 6.)
The one-child dummyhas an insigniﬁcant but negative coefﬁcient, suggesting that having only one child reduces the likelihood for
him towork in familyﬁrms in general. However, having aﬁrst-bornmale child signiﬁcantly increases his likelihood ofworking in their
own ﬁrms by 14% to 17%, and also increases the likelihood of having the second child working in family ﬁrms by 21%. Moreover, hav-
ing a second-bornmale child signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood for him towork in the familyﬁrmby 25%. On the other hand, having
a second-born male child does not affect the likelihood of having the ﬁrst-born child working in their own ﬁrms. This evidence sug-
gests a constraint effect of having fewer children on within-family succession. Although the ﬁrst-born male child is often by default
more likely to be chosen for within-family succession, having more children will increase the likelihood of within-family succession
often via tournament, throughwhich founders seem to select their best heirs.We however cannot rule out a possibility that founders
choose to have a second-born male child when the ﬁrst born child is female, who is less expected to succeed to family businesses.
4.2. The corporate effects
The previous section shows that the availability of heirs affects family ﬁrm succession decisions. In this section, we further inves-
tigate the corporate effects, that is, whether the availability of children affects corporate capital raising decisions. We use the survey
data to construct two variables: the tendency to issue equity via IPO and raise money via bond issuance. The two measures capture
external capital raising activities of family ﬁrms. The Probit regression results are reported in Table 8. The explanatory variables of
interest include either one-child dummy or number of children. Other controls include owner's age, owner's education level, ﬁrm
location, ﬁrm vintage year, logarithm of sales, and ROS.
We ﬁnd that having one child reduces the likelihood of expecting an IPO by 5% while having more children increases IPO
expectation signiﬁcantly. Younger or well-educated founders are more likely to show IPO tendency, similarly, larger ﬁrms or ﬁrms
Table 6
Two-stage regression on the determinants of within-family succession.
Explanatory variable Dependent variable
One_Child
First stage
Family_Management
(i) Probit
Adult_Kid_In
(ii) Probit
Founder's age at year 1980 −3.66⁎⁎⁎
(12.76)
Dummy (Minority race) −2.80
(0.23)
Prior working in government 19.57⁎⁎⁎
(3.94)
Firm_Village_Town −13.02⁎⁎ 5.29⁎⁎ 0.0.14
(2.57) (2.83) (0.19)
Predicted (One_Child) −17.26⁎ −60.11⁎⁎⁎
(1.89) (3.44)
Firm_Age 0.40⁎ 0.15
(1.70) (1.36)
Owner_Age 0.77 0.78⁎⁎⁎
(0.74) (3.78)
Owner_College −7.78⁎⁎⁎ −5.06⁎⁎⁎
(3.52) (3.86)
Capital_Ownership (%) 0.80⁎⁎⁎ 2.15
(7.98) (1.47)
Log(Sales) −4.86⁎⁎⁎ 0.52
(7.80) (1.56)
ROS 12.20 0.67
(0.79) (0.28)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3258 3258 3258
Adj R2 0.05 0.08 0.32
Wald exogeneity test (p-value) 0.00
Notes: In the probit regression, the instrumental variable is the dummy forminority race, dummyof owner age greater than 35 at year of the one-child policy enactment,
family size, and rural dummy. If family ﬁrm founders are of minority race or have a child before 1980, they and their families will not be subject to the one-child policy.
This table reports the impact of the one child policy on ﬁrm's dynastic management with the 1997 survey data on Chinese small and medium enterprises. In the ﬁrst
stage regression, the dependent variable is dummy variable equalling one for having one child. The instrument is a dummy variable if founder's age is above 35 in 1980,
minority race dummy if founder is not of the Han race. In the second stage regression, the analysis employs Probit regressions. In the second stage regression, the de-
pendent variables include Family_Management (dummy equaling 1 if ﬁrm is expected to continue under family management) and Adult_Kid_In (dummy equals 1 if
adult children are working in family ﬁrms). The variable of interest is an expected variable of having 1 child due to the one child policy from the ﬁrst stage Probit re-
gression. The robust t-stat is reported in parentheses.
⁎ Represents 10% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎ Represents 5% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎⁎ Represents 1% statistical signiﬁcance.
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withmore vintage years are also likely to havemore IPOs. Regarding the bond issue, havingmore children increases the expectation of
issuing bonds while the one child dummy has a negative but insigniﬁcant impact.
The ﬁndings reported in Table 8 suggest that the availability of children plays an important role in shaping the founder's expecta-
tion of raising external ﬁnancing. One explanation is that when family ﬁrms have a limited pool of heirs for within-family succession,
they are less likely to have long-run planning and thus invest less into their future growth. This is consistentwith theﬁndings reported
in the previous section that family ﬁrms plan less into their future succession or family management due to lack of heirs.
If founders feel that constraints due to lack of enough talent will jeopardize within-family succession, we should expect that they
make corporate decisions corresponding to such planning horizons. The availability of children will therefore affect ﬁrms' long-run
corporate investment. We examine such effect with reinvestment rate and R&D and relate them to either the one-child dummy or
number of children. The regression results are reported in Table 9. The dependent variables in the Tobit regressions include reinvest-
ment/sales and R&D expenses/sales. Tobit regressions are used because the dependent variable is bounded below by zero. Technically
Tobit regressions are best applied for dependent variables that are left censored, although often Tobit is applied in contexts with
bounded below by zero.While there are somedifferences between Tobit andOLS in terms of economic signiﬁcance, themain ﬁndings
are not affected either way with the use of Tobit versus OLS.
The results show that having one child negatively affects both reinvestment rate and R&D, both effects statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. For example the one child dummy reduces reinvestment rate by 14% and R&D by 8% marginally, respectively, both
are economically signiﬁcant. Similarly, the number of children increases ﬁrm's reinvestment rate and R&D, with the effects both eco-
nomically and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Well-educated founders are also more likely to increase R&D for their family
ﬁrms.
Overall, the ﬁndings in this section suggest that family ﬁrms invest less into future growth either through current reinvestment,
R&D investment or external ﬁnancing raising activities. There are two explanations for causing such corporate effects. On one hand,
family ﬁrms which do not expect to pass the control might be seeking less external capital themselves due to demand side explana-
tion. Alternatively, it could be that since the providers of external ﬁnance (stock and debtmarkets) do not expect theﬁrm to survive in
the long term they are not willing to provide enough funding for the ﬁrm's investment. We cannot differentiate these two explana-
tions, while future research should aim to answer which explanation is more pertinent.
Table 7
Analysis of the determinants of dynastic management in the family ﬁrm.
Explanatory variable Dependent variable
Dummy (1st adult child works in the family
ﬁrm)
Dummy (2nd adult child works in the family
ﬁrm)
(i) Probit (ii) Probit (iii) Probit (iv) Probit
One_Child −0.343⁎⁎
[−14%]
(2.13)
Child1_Gender (male) 0.353⁎⁎ 0.534⁎⁎ 0.297⁎⁎ 0.237⁎⁎
[14%] [17%] [22%] [21%]
(2.06) (2.13) 2.25 2.27
Child2_Gender (male) 0.116 0.663⁎⁎⁎ 0.707⁎⁎
[4%] [29%] [25%]
(0.50) (2.79) (2.67)
Owner_Age −0.001 0.006 0.028 −0.009
(0.10) (0.40) (1.88) (0.073)
Family_Size 0.099⁎⁎ 0.075⁎ 0.049 0.202
(2.59) (1.66) (1.15) (0.193)
Capital_Ownership (%) 0.145 0.263 1.815
(0.46) (0.62) (1.318)
(Log)Sales 0.206⁎⁎⁎ 0.237⁎⁎⁎ −0.326⁎⁎⁎ −0.306⁎⁎⁎
(3.80) (3.39) (3.84) (7.22)
Board −0.661⁎⁎ −0.479 −1.318⁎⁎ −0.843⁎⁎⁎
(2.17) (1.57) (2.66) (3.16)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −3.492⁎⁎⁎ −4.773⁎⁎⁎ −1.315⁎⁎ −2.547
(3.96) (4.53) (0.294) (4.250)
Observations 350 134 226 63
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11
Notes: The table reports regression coefﬁcients: the marginal probability is given only for the ﬁrst three independent variables in brackets.
This table reports the determinants of family ﬁrm's dynastic management with the 1997 survey data on Chinese small and medium enterprises. The analysis employs
Probit regressions. In (i) and (ii), the dependent variable is a dummy equaling 1 if the 1st adult childworks in the family ﬁrms; in (iii) and (iv), the dependent variable is
a dummy equaling 1 if the 2nd adult child works in family ﬁrms. The robust t-stat is reported in parentheses.
⁎ Represents 10% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎ Represents 5% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎⁎ Represents 1% statistical signiﬁcance.
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5. Conclusions
Using two comprehensive surveys on small andmedium family ﬁrms in China, we systematically examine how the one-child pol-
icy affects family ﬁrmdynasticmanagement andwithin-family succession decisions. Our research is the ﬁrst to examine the economic
implications of human capital constraints especially due to the one-child policy on the succession or dynastic management of family
ﬁrms.
We empirically measure the binding constraints of the one-child policy with either the dummy of having one child or number of
children for a given founder. Our ﬁndings show that human capital constraints such as having only one child impose signiﬁcant con-
straints on family ﬁrms' dynastic management. For example, the availability of one child reduces a founder's succession expectations
that his family will continue management and control of the family business. Having one child also results in less within-family suc-
cession by decreasing the likelihood of adult childrenworking in family ﬁrms. Instead of using the dummy of having one child, we use
the number of children available for within-family succession. The ﬁndings show that the number of children affects within-family
succession signiﬁcantly consistent with the prediction that fewer children result in constraints on within-family succession.
We furthermore investigatewhether this relationship is driven by the tournament theory.We use a subsample of ﬁrmswithmore
than one child. The results show that having a ﬁrst-born male child is important for within-family succession while having a second
son will also increase his likelihood of working in the family ﬁrm but not affect the ﬁrst son's likelihood. This evidence supports the
tournament theory in the sense that having more children especially sons increases the likelihood for both to work in family ﬁrms.
The one-child policy should have corporate effects if it imposes constraints on family succession decisions. We indeed report ﬁnd-
ings that having one child can cause ﬁrms to invest less into future growth. For example, family ﬁrms with one heir are less likely to
have an IPO plan and less likely to raise funds via bonds, both important channels for raising external ﬁnancing. Similarly, we show
that familyﬁrmswith only oneheir show lower reinvestment rate or R&D, both directly capturingﬁrm's current investment for future
growth.
Our analysis is subject to endogeneity concerns, since the human capital constraints may be imposed by the one child policy
or voluntarily determined by entrepreneurs. We address such endogeneity concerns with two-stage regressions. In the ﬁrst stage
regression, we use instruments that are not related to within-family succession. The instruments include age of founder at the year
of enactment of the one-child policy, dummy ofminority race for founders, dummy of location in rural areas and dummy of founder's
prior job in government sectors. Since the one child policy applies to people with different binding effects, we use the predicted prob-
ability of having one child as an independent variable in the second stage regression and investigate its effect on family succession.
Table 8
Probit analysis of the determinants of expectation of having IPOs and having board.
Explanatory variable Dependent variable
IPO_Hope Bond_Hope
(i) Probit (ii) Probit (iii) Probit (iv) Probit
One_Child −5.69⁎⁎⁎ −0.98
(2.97) (1.58)
Num_Child 3.62⁎⁎ 0.82⁎
(2.50) (1.94)
Owner_Age −0.27⁎⁎ −0.31⁎⁎ −0.05 −0.07
(2.39) (2.58) (1.25) (0.94)
Owner_College 10.76⁎⁎⁎ 10.94⁎⁎⁎ 1.15⁎ 1.21⁎
(5.77) (5.87) (1.72) (1.84)
Firm_Village_Town −2.15 −2.47 −0.32 −0.38
(1.18) (1.36) (0.97) (0.42)
Firm_Age 0.36⁎ 0.37⁎ 0.07 0.07
(1.78) (1.81) (0.27) (0.17)
Capital_Ownership −0.02 −0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.66) (0.76) (0.12) (0.11)
Log(Sales) 7.82⁎⁎⁎ 7.82⁎⁎⁎ 1.05⁎⁎⁎ 1.04⁎⁎⁎
(12.54) (12.54) (5.74) (5.78)
ROS 4.44 4.93 2.35⁎⁎ 2.59⁎⁎
(0.56) (0.56) (2.41) (2.75)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3258 3258 3258 3258
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.10
Notes: The table reports marginal probability coefﬁcients.
This table reports the determinants of family ﬁrm's ﬁnancial management with the 2002 survey data on Chinese small and medium enterprises. The sample includes
1865 observations with sales greater than 10,000 RMB. The analysis employs Probit regressions. In (i) and (ii), the dependent variable is IPO_Hope (dummy equals 1 if
the founder has expectation that the ﬁrmwill go public); in (iii) and (iv), the dependent variable is Bond_Hope (dummy equals 1 if the founder has expectation of issue
bond). The robust t-stat is reported in parentheses.
⁎ Represents 10% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎ Represents 5% statistical signiﬁcance.
⁎⁎⁎ Represents 1% statistical signiﬁcance.
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Conﬁrming with previous analysis, the one-child policy negatively affects family succession. The effects become stronger both
economically and statistically than those reported in the one-stage regressions.
Overall, this research suggests that the one-child policy has imposed signiﬁcant economic constraints on family ﬁrms' succession
and dynastic management. Speciﬁcally, such a policy exogenously reduces the availability of talented heirs, which in turn greatly
lowerswithin-family successions and results in discontinuity of family ﬁrms sincemost family ﬁrms rely onwithin-family succession.
Such human capital constraints imposed by the one-child policy have economic costs to society: it substantially reduces entrepre-
neurs' long-term incentives to invest in future growth, which may reduce the prevalence of family businesses in China.
This research has several important policy implications. First, as the Chinese government is gradually phasing out the one-child
policy, we think that this policymay beneﬁt family ﬁrms especially those suffering from a lack of enough heirs for family successions.
Secondly, our ﬁndings on corporate effects suggest that family ﬁrmsmay invest less into future growth due to the external constraint
imposed by the one-child policy. The gradual phasing out this policy will positively contribute to the future development of the
economy since family ﬁrms are important constituents of the economy.
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